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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After being initially deemed incompetent to stand trial, and subsequently 
receiving treatment for schizophrenia and being determined to be competent, Michael 
Jockumsen pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation. Mr. Jockumsen's competency 
evaluations, performed pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, were appended to the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and were further referenced multiple times during 
the sentencing hearings conducted by the district court. 
Despite acknowledging a lack of information regarding the degree to which 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness contributed to his offense or to his potential risk to the 
community, the district court did not order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522 prior to sentencing. Rather, the court sentenced Mr. Jockumsen to eight 
years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. The court further provided Mr. 
Jockumsen's competency evaluations, along with other materials, to a psychiatrist from 
the Department of Correction during the period of retained jurisdiction, and asked the 
psychiatrist to draw an opinion from these materials with regard to Mr. Jockumsen's 
prognosis and suitability for probation. The district court subsequently relinquished 
jurisdiction. 
Mr. Jockumsen timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing 
jurisdiction, and asserts that the district court's use of his competency evaluations at 
sentencing and the rider review hearing was an abuse of discretion and constituted a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and compelled 
testimony. Additionally, Mr. Jockumsen submits that the district court abused its 
discretion and acted in manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, when the court failed to sua 
sponfe order a mental health evaluation in accordance with I.C. Cj 19-2522. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Mr. Jockumsen was charged with second degree kidnapping and attempted 
strangulation. (R., pp.48-49.) Pursuant to an oral motion by defense counsel, the 
district court ordered an evaluation pursuant to I.C. Cj 18-211 to determine whether 
Mr. Jockumsen was competent to stand trial. (R., pp.34-35.) 
Based on Dr. John Christensen's determination that Mr. Jockumsen was not 
competent to stand trial, the district court ordered Mr. Jockumsen's commitment for 90 
days pending a determination of whether Mr. Jockumsen would be fit to stand trial in the 
foreseeable future. (R., pp.42-43.) The district court also ordered Dr. Christensen to 
conduct a follow-up evaluation to determine whether Mr. Jockumsen was competent to 
stand trial several weeks later. (R., pp.53-54.) 
The district court held a hearing with regard to this second competency 
evaluation. (2114107 ~ r . ' ,  p.5, L.5 - p.18, L.24.) The court heard telephonic testimony 
from Dr. Christensen, who testified that Mr. Jockumsen was competent for purposes of 
standing trial and entering a guilty plea. (2114107 Tr., 7, L.25 - p.14, L.6, p.14, Ls.3-6.) 
Dr. Christensen testified that his latest evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen's competency 
indicated that he was malingering, and that he had the capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him at the time of the hearing. (2114107 Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.14.) 
Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings, for ease of 
reference, citations to the transcripts in this case will be made with regard to the date on 
which the proceedings occurred. 
However, Dr. Christensen did note that Mr. Jockumsen's "psychiatric state" could vaiy 
in its impacts on Mr. Jockumsen's behavior or understanding over time. (2114107 
Tr., p.9, Ls.15-21.) Counsel for Mr. Jockumsen did not challenge the findings of 
Dr. Christensen. (2114107 Tr., p.15, Ls.16-17.) The district court found that 
Mr. Jockumsen was competent. (2/14107 Tr., p.17, L.15 - p.18, L.24.) 
At this same hearing, Mr. Jockumsen entered a guilty plea to attempted 
strangulation. (2114107 Tr., p.20, L.8 - p.21, L.7, p.33, Ls.9-16.) In exchange, the State 
dismissed its allegation of kidnapping. (2114107 Tr., p.21, L.12 - p.22, L.9.) Appended 
to the PSI that was prepared for this case were all of the competency evaluations that 
were performed pursuant to I.C. 3 18-21 1. (PSI, pp.17-39.') 
During the initial sentencing hearing, one of the main points of contention was 
the degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness was a factor at sentencing and how 
this factor should influence the court's sentencing determination. (413107 Tr., p.36, L.24 
- p.62, L.3.) The district court acknowledged that mental illness was an issue that it 
should consider in this case. (413107 Tr., p.37, Ls.20-21.) Mr. Jockumsen, through 
counsel, repeatedly asserted that his mental illness was a contributing factor to his 
underlying offense, such that it had a material impact on Mr. Jockumsen's underlying 
culpability for his crime. (413107 Tr., p.38, L.7 - p.39, L.21.) However, the district court 
cut off Mr. Jockumsen's argument regarding the degree to which his condition 
contributed to his offense. (413107 Tr., p.39, Ls.22-25.) 
* For ease of reference, unnumbered pages of the PSI are hand-numbered 
consecutively, beginning at page 17. 
Mr. Jockumsen also personally testified to the fact that his psychosis was a 
predominate factor in triggering his underlying offense in this case. (413107 Tr., p.42, 
Ls.11-19.) He also provided additional information about his personal struggles with 
mental illness for a significant period of his adult life, and as to the benefits to his mental 
health now that he was taking appropriate medications to treat his mental illness. 
(413107 Tr., p.45, Ls.18-20, p.46, Ls.15-21, p.47, L.23 - p.48, L.1.) 
The district court acknowledged the sentencing factors regarding appropriate 
considerations of a defendant's mental health conditions found in I.C. § 19-2523. 
(413107 Tr., p.51, Ls.19-22.) However, the district court relied on information contained 
in evaluations performed to assess Mr. Jockumsen's competency to stand trial in finding 
that there was conflicting evidence regarding his mental illness and whether he could be 
malingering. (413107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-20.) The district court also explicitly referenced the 
contents of a competency evaluation performed by Dr. Christensen in February, 2007, 
including some of Mr. Jockumsen's statements made during the course of the 
competency evaluation, as part of its consideration on the record at the initial 
sentencing hearing. (413107 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-12.) Although the court believed that 
Mr. Jockumsen posed a potential risk to society, the district court also admitted, "It's just 
difficult for me to measure just how great that risk is. So it's worrisome to me." (413107 
Tr., p.54, Ls.21-24.) 
Despite the court's own acknowledgement of the centrality of Mr. Jockumsen's 
mental health issues to the pertinent considerations of fashioning an appropriate 
sentence, the district court did not sua sponte order a mental health evaluation pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-2522. Instead, the district court continued the sentencing hearing in order to 
contact someone with Department of Correction to see whether they could perform a 
psychological assessment of Mr. Jockumsen during his period of retained jurisdiction. 
(413107 Tr., p.61, Ls.2-18.) And, despite a lack of a psychological evaluation prepared 
for purposes of sentencing, the district court announced its intention to impose a prison 
sentence. (413107 Tr., p. 16, 1s. 19-23.) 
At the second sentencing hearing, the district court revealed that it had attempted 
to get in touch with Dr. Mary perrien3, a staff psychiatrist with the Department of 
Correction, in order to obtain more information about an assessment of 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions specifically for purposes of sentencing. 
(419107 Tr., p. 4, Ls.14-19.) The district court then indicated that it intended upon 
imposing sentence and retaining jurisdiction, but would ask for the Department of 
Correction to provide additional information regarding Mr. Jockumsen's mental health 
for use at the rider review hearing. (419107 Tr., p.6, Ls.19-25.) 
The State objected to the district court retaining jurisdiction, asserting, "I think 
that just because he has a mental health - I guess some questions about his mental 
health, I think that can still be addressed at prison." (419J07 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-17.) 
Mr. Jockumsen argued in favor of the court retaining jurisdiction. (419107 Tr., p.9, Ls. 10- 
18.) 
The district court again noted its difficulties in assessing Mr. Jockumsen's 
potential risk to the community in light of his significant mental health problems. The 
court stated: 
It appears that Dr. Perrien's name is misspelled in the transcript for the second 
sentencing hearing. (See, e.g., 419107 Tr., p.4, L.20; Letter to district court from 
Dr. Perrien, dated August 3, 2007.) 
The fact of the matter is that right now, Mr. Jockumsen, you are a risk to 
the community. What I'm having trouble getting my arms around is 
whether it's because that's a result of your criminal thinking or whether it's 
the result of issues of mental illness or whether it's some combination of 
the two. 
(419107 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-21.) However, the district court was apparently unaware of the 
provisions of I.C. $j 19-2522, since the court when on to state that, "The only way I can 
know whether [release into the community] is appropriate is to wait and see how you 
might do in the retained jurisdiction setting and wait and see what the Department of 
Correction's psychiatrist may have to say about your mental health issues." (419107 
Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.) 
The district court proceeded to sentence Mr. Jockumsen to eight years, with 
three years fixed, for his guilty plea to attempted strangulation. (419107 Tr., p.17, Ls.1- 
4.) After announcing Mr. Jockumsen's sentence, the district court then retained 
jurisdiction and stated its intentions with regards to obtaining more information regarding 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions. (4/9/07 Tr., p.19, L.12 - p.20, L.4.) The 
court indicated that it would send Mr. Jockumsen's prior competency evaluations to 
Dr. Perrien to be considered in conducting the mental health evaluation of 
Mr. Jockumsen. (419107 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-19.) The court further indicated that it would 
ask Dr. Perrien to provide the court with any opinions regarding Mr. Jockumsen's 
mental health and whether he could be successful in a supervised probation setting. 
(419107 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.4.) Neither Mr. Jockumsen nor the State objected to the 
district court retaining jurisdiction prior to obtaining a mental health evaluation pursuant 
to I .C. § 19-2522. (419107 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.) 
At the rider review hearing, the district court gave substantial consideration both 
to the prior competency evaluations and to the letter drafted by Dr. Perrien that was 
based, in large part, on the competency evaluations. (8127107 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.) The 
court also considered the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafier, APSI), which recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. 
(8127107 Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.1 I ,  L.18; APSI, p.4.) Mr. Jockumsen argued that many of his 
disciplinary issues while he was serving his rider were attributable to the fact that he 
was not receiving medication at the time. (8127107 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-18.) He also asserted 
that, with proper treatment, he could be safely placed on probation. (8127107 Tr., p.13, 
L.24 - p.15, L.6.) 
The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Jockumsen's case and 
executed his original sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (8127107 Tr., p.34, 
Ls.13-19; R., pp.75-77.) In describing the court's conclusions in support of its decision 
to relinquish jurisdiction, the district court relied heavily both on the evaluations 
conducted to determine Mr. Jockumsen's competency to stand trial, and on 
Dr. Perrien's letter that was also largely predicated on the competency evaluations. 
(8127107 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23, p.33, L.20 - p.34, L.5.) Mr. Jockumsen timely appeals from 
the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing his sentence. (R., p.79.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and I.C. § 18-215, when it 
improperly used information obtained for purposes of determining 
Mr. Jockumsen's competency at sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest disregard for the 
pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. 9 19-2522, when it 
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen prior to 
sentencing? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth 
f  
Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of Determinina Mr. Jockumsen's Comuetency 
At Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Jockumsen asserts that the district court improperly considered his 
statements, and the medical conclusions based directly upon these statements, 
contained within his competency evaluation for purposes of aggravation at sentencing. 
A defendant has a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination that applies to 
statements made in the course of competency evaluations. It is a violation of the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to use his statements, made in the context of a 
competency evaluation, against him at sentencing in absence of appropriate warnings 
and a valid waiver by the defendant at the time of the competency examination. In 
addition, under I.C. § 18-215, the defendant's statements in competency evaluations 
cannot be used against the defendant at sentencing in absence of a valid waiver. 
The district court's use of the competency evaluations, and Mr. Jockumsen's 
statements therein, against Mr. Jockumsen at sentencing violated both constitutional 
and statutory standards attendant on the court's use of discretion. Moreover, the failure 
of the district court to excise the information from the competency evaluations that were 
attached to and incorporated within the presentence report likewise constituted an 
abuse of the court's discretion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth 
Amendment Riuhts Aqainst Self-Incrimination And I.C. S 18-215, When It 
Considered Statements Made By Mr. Jockumsen, And Diaclnoses That Were 
Made Based Upon His Statements, In Aggravation At Sentencing 
Use of a defendant's statements made during the course of a competency 
evaluation may not constitutionally be considered by the trial court in aggravation at 
sentencing in absence of a warning to the defendant that he has a Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent at the time the competency evaluation is performed. Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-474 (1981). The Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination applies in the context of psychological evaluations, including competency 
evaluations. Id. at 465; see also Esfrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, $49 P.3d 833, 
838 (2006). Moreover, where a medical diagnosis from a competency evaluation is 
partly predicated on the statements of the defendant, that diagnosis should likewise not 
be considered at sentencing. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 464. In particular, the Court in Estelle 
highlighted that it was improper to introduce at sentencing the competency evaluator's 
conclusion that the defendant lacked remorse because this determination, and the 
overall assessment of future dangerousness contained within the competency 
examination, was based on the defendant's own statements that he made in absence of 
a warning of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. While such unwarned 
statements can be used for the limited purpose of establishing competency, they cannot 
be used in aggravation at sentencing. Id. at 468-469. 
Such a use of information obtained in the course of conducting competency 
evaluations also runs afoul of the provisions of I.C. § 18-215. This statute provides, in 
pertinent part, that statements made by a person during a psychological or psychiatric 
exam ordered pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, "shall not be admissible in evidence in any 
criminal proceeding against [the defendant] on any issue other than the defendant's 
ability to assist counsel at trial or to form any specific intent which is an element of the 
crime charged, except that such statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or 
psychologist as are relevant for impeachment purposes may be received subject to the 
usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment." I.C. § 18-215. 
In interpreting this provision, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that it constitutes 
an abuse of discretion if information and statements from a competency evaluation are 
improperly relied upon at sentencing. State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 492, 499, 129 P.3d 
1241, 1248 (2006). "Ultimately, the determination of whether a particular sentence is an 
abuse of discretion depends upon the information that is used in framing the sentence." 
Id. While the Court in Cope found that the improperly included information from the 
competency evaluations did not infect the sentence, the same cannot be said in this 
case. Id. at 500-501, 129 P.3d at 1249-1250. 
Here, the district court plainly sought information for use in fashioning a sentence 
directly from the competency evaluations themselves, and a letter from Dr. Perrien that 
was expressly based upon the competency evaluations, at the initial sentencing 
hearings and at Mr. Jockumsen's rider review hearing. The court considered these 
evaluations directly at Mr. Jockumsen's initial sentencing hearing. (413107 Tr., p.53, 
Ls.2-13, p.56, Ls.4-12.) The court also sent copies of the competency evaluations to 
Dr. Perrien to use as the basis for an evaluation on her part regarding how 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health issues should impact on his sentencing, particularly with 
regard to his potential placement on probation. (419107 Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.4.) A 
review of Dr. Perrien's letter in response to the court's request reveals that she did not 
undertake a separate evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen, but rather formed her opinions 
based upon the documentary materials provided her by the district court. (Letter to the 
district court from Dr. Perrien, dated August 3, 2007.) These materials were the sum 
and substance of the evidence relied on by the district court to evaluate 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions at the rider review hearing. (8127107 
Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.) 
Unlike Cope, where there was expert testimony at sentencing regarding the 
defendant's mental health conditions that was wholly independent of the competency 
evaluations, there was no source of information in this case on Mr. Jockumsen's mental 
health conditions that was not fatally infected with improper reliance on the inadmissible 
competence evaluations and Mr. Jockumsen's statements therein. See Cope, 142 
ldaho at 500-502, 129 P.3d at 1249-1251. As such, the district court abused its 
discretion when the court improperly relied on the information contained in 
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluation as aggravating evidence at sentencing. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth 
Amendment Rishts Aqainst Self-Incrimination and I.C. Ij 'f8-215, When The 
Court Failed To Remove Mr. Jockumsen's Competency Evaluations That Were 
lmproperlv Included Within The Presentence lnvestiqation Report 
As previously noted, it is unconstitutional to use a defendant's statements, made 
without warning of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, in 
aggravation at sentencing. In this case, not only did the district court improperly 
considered this information in aggravation at sentencing, but the district court also failed 
to remove this information that was improperly included within Mr. Jockumsen's PSI. As 
the ldaho Supreme Court noted in Cope, the improper inclusion of competency 
evaluations or statements therefrom in presentence investigation reports may constitute 
an abuse of discretion if this evidence infects the sentence. Cope, 142 Idaho at 500, 
129 P.3d at 1249. 
Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations were appended to the PSI in this case. 
(PSI, pp.17-39.) In addition, the presentence investigator commented directly on 
Mr. Jockumsen's statements made during the course of his competency evaluation as 
part of the factual background of this case and Mr. Jockumsen's social history. (PSI, 
pp.9, 10.) The evaluator discussed at length the substance of Mr. Jockumsen's 
competency evaluations with regard to his overall mental health conditions. (PSI, 
pp.11-13.) Also of note is the fact that the presentence investigator presented only the 
conclusions indicating that Mr. Jockumsen was "malingering" for purposes of the 
competency determination from the prior competency examinations, and further 
misrepresented one of Mr. Jockumsen's anti-psychosis medications as treating 
insomnia in the section addressing the investigator's analysis and comments on the 
defendant's condition. (PSI, p.15; see also Point I1 infra.) 
The investigator never mentioned that Mr. Jockumsen was actively receiving 
treatment for schizophrenia while being assessed for competency, or that the 
psychiatric evaluations continued to recognize that Mr. Jockumsen may suffer from 
psychosis. (PSI, pp.14-15, 21-22, 28, 32, 39.) As such, not only did the presentence 
investigator improperly and extensively rely on the competency evaluations in reaching 
her conclusions in this case, but the investigator also appears to have selectively 
presented only that information from the evaluations that was harmful to Mr. Jockumsen 
at sentencing, 
The Court of Appeals in State v. Rodriguez has aptly noted how information 
improperly contained in presentence investigation reports has the potential to prejudice 
a defendant beyond the district court's immediate sentencing decision. Sfate v. 
Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 262 n.1, 971 P.2d 327, 328 (Ct. App. 1998). The Rodriguez 
court observed: 
The use of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The 
report goes to the Department of Corrections and may be considered by 
the Commission of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the defendant's 
suitability for parole. See I.C.R. 32(h). In addition, if the defendant 
reoffends, any prior PSI is usually presented to the sentencing court with 
an update report from the presentence investigator. Thus, a PSI follows a 
defendant indefinitely, and information inappropriately included therein 
may prejudice the defendant even if the initial sentencing court 
disregarded such information. 
Id. 
In the case, the potential for Mr. Jockumsen's statements made in the course of 
his competency evaluations, the conclusions of the evaluators that flowed therefrom, 
and the selective referencing of these reports by the presentence investigator, have the 
potential for repeated future violations of Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment rights. This 
information was improperly included in his presentence investigation report, and has 
every potential be used against Mr. Jockurnsen when it comes to his ability to obtain 
release on parole. As noted by the Rodriquez Court, this information follows 
Mr. Jockurnsen indefinitely. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho at 262 n. I, 971 P.2d at 328. In light 
of this, the district court abused its discretion, and failed to act in accordance with 
I.C. 3 18-215, when the court failed to remove Mr. Jockumsen's competency 
evaluations, and references to the contents of the evaluations, from the PSI. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Acted In Manifest Disreaard of I.C.R. 32 
and I.C. 5 19-2522, When It Failed To Sua Sponfe Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of 
Mr. Jockumsen Prior To Sentencing 
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19- 
2522 is discretionary with the district court. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 144 ldaho 408, 
409, 162 P.3d 787, 788 (Ct. App. 2007). However, as with any exercise of discretion, 
the district court's determination must be consistent with applicable legal standards. 
State V. Coonfs, 137 ldaho 150, 152, 44 P.3d 1205, 1207 (Ct. App. 2002). "The legal 
standards governing the court's decision whether to order a psychological evaluation 
and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522." Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. 
ldaho Code § 19-2522 provides that a mental health evaluation is mandatory, rather 
than discretionary, if there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the 
defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown. Coonfs, 
137 ldaho at 152, 44 P.3d at 1207; State v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 
158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). This Court will uphold the failure of the district court to order 
a mental health evaluation if the record supports the finding that there was no reason to 
believe that the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing 
or if the information already before the district court meets the requirements of I.C. § 19- 
2522. State v. Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 189,45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Admittedly, Mr. Jockumsen did not object to the lack of a psychological 
evaluation in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 prior to the district court retaining 
jurisdiction in this case. However, it is well recognized that a district court may be under 
an independent duty to order a mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 under 
certain circumstances, even in absence of a request on the part of the defendant. "A 
claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponfe order a 
psychological evaluation of a defendant before sentencing can be made on appeal 
without an objection to the lack of an evaluation or a request for an evaluation before 
the district court." State v. Durham, 146 ldaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 
2008). If the defendant does not object to the failure of the district court to order a 
mental health evaluation, the defendant must demonstrate that the district court 
manifestly disregarded the relevant provisions of I.C.R. 32 by failing to order the 
psychological examination. Id. This Court generally looks to the information contained 
within, or omitted from, the Presentence Investigation Report to identify the need for a 
psychological evaluation. Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 788. 
If the court's comments indicate that it found the defendant's mental condition 
and rehabilitative potential to be significant factors, and the district court nonetheless 
proceeds to sentencing "without the benefit of a professional diagnosis of that condition 
and prognosis for improvement," this is a factor that supports the finding that there is 
reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
sentencing. Mcfarland, 125 ldaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163. Here, the record is replete 
with the district court's acknowledgement of the importance of Mr. Jockumsen's mental 
health conditions to its sentencing determination, as well as the recognition that the 
court was without necessary information in order to properly determine how 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness should impact his sentence. 
At the initial sentencing hearing, the district court expressly stated that 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness was an issue that the court felt it should consider. 
(413107 Tr., p.37, Ls.20-21.) The court also noted the statutory criteria provided in 
I.C. § 19-2523 regarding consideration of the defendant's mental conditions at 
sentencing. (413107 Tr., p.51, Ls.19-22.) 
Despite knowing that Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions were relevant and 
should be given weight at sentencing, the district court also made several statements 
indicating that it was without the necessary information at the time of sentencing to 
determine precisely how Mr. Jockumsen's conditions should effect his sentence. The 
court noted that the evidence of Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions were "somewhat 
ambiguous," and not always consistent. (413107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-20.) Despite a sense 
that Mr. Jockumsen may pose a danger to the community, the court also acknowledged, 
"It's just difficult for me to measure just how great that risk is. So it's worrisome to me." 
(413107 Tr., p.54, Ls.21-24.) The district court reiterated this concern at the subsequent 
sentencing hearing, where the court stated: "The fact of the matter is that right now, 
Mr. Jockumsen, you are a risk to the community. What I'm having trouble getting my 
arms around is whether it's because that's a result of your criminal thinking or whether 
it's the result of issues of mental illness or whether it's some combination of the two." 
(419107 Tr., p.14, Ls.15-21.) 
Beyond the district court's own explicit acknowledgment that Mr. Jockumsen's 
mental health conditions were a central factor at sentencing, and the extensive 
argument presented by Mr. Jockumsen and the State regarding how Mr. Jockumsen's 
mental health conditions should impact the court's sentencing decision, other factors in 
this case demonstrate that his mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing. 
Mr. Jockumsen's prior criminal record reveals no past crimes of violence until 
approximately one month prior to the charge at issue in this appeal. (PSI, pp.4-6.) His 
prior offenses were mainly charges of petit theft and driving under the influence. (PSI, 
pp.4-6.) This sudden escalation from relatively petty crimes to allegations of a series of 
violent offenses is an important indication of the need for a mental health evaluation. 
See Durham, 146 ldaho at 367, 195 P.3d at 726; Collins, 144 ldaho at 409, 162 P.3d at 
788; Craner, 137 ldaho at 190, 45 P.3d at 846; McFarland, 125 ldaho at 880, 876 P.2d 
at 162. 
As has been noted by the court in Coonfs, the court's awareness from an early 
stage in the proceedings that the defendant suffered from a serious mental illness, 
coupled with an awareness that the defendant was receiving medications to treat that 
illness, is also sufficient to alert the court that the defendant's mental condition would be 
an important consideration at sentencing. Coonfs, 137 ldaho at 152-153, 44 P.3d at 
1207-1208. Here, the court knew at a very early stage that Mr. Jockumsen had mental 
health issues, because Mr. Jockumsen's counsel asked that he be evaluated for 
competency at a preliminary hearing, and there were questions of his competency that 
persisted during the initial stages of this criminal case. (R., pp.32, 34-36, 40, 42-44, 53- 
54, 62-63.) Moreover, there was significant evidence before the district court at 
sentencing that Mr. Jockumsen was receiving anti-psychosis medications. (413107 
Tr.,p.47,L.23-p.48,L.l;4/9/07Tr.,p.10,Ls.10-16;PSI,pp.12,15,28.) 
Mr. Jockumsen's own statements also indicated the need for a mental health 
evaluation. Mr. Jockumsen repeatedly expressed the belief that evil witchcraft or 
sorcery was the cause of the commission of his crimes. (8127107 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, 
L.8; p.27, Ls.12-18.) He also has consistently maintained that his current offense was 
the result of a psychotic break when he was not adequately medicated for his mental 
illness. (413107 Tr., p.42, Ls.16-19, p.45, Ls.18-20; 4/9/07 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-16.) 
While the record clearly demonstrates that there was every reason to believe that 
Mr. Jockumsen suffered from severe mental health issues, nothing in the record 
otherwise met with the requirements for the types of informed considerations that must 
be made pursuant to I.C. 3 19-2522(3). 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the district court's decision to order a 
mental health evaluation from the Department of Correction has already been held not 
to satisfy the mandate of I.C. § 19-2522. Coonts, 137 ldaho at 153, 44 P.3d at 1208. In 
Coonts, the court held: 
Section 19-2522 does not require a psychological evaluation merely to 
enlighten officials who must make decisions on the defendant's conditions 
of confinement and treatment while incarcerated; the statute requires that 
the evaluation be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will 
have the benefit of the evaluator's insights inWfashioning an appropriate 
sentence. 
Id. (See also 4/3/07 Tr., p.57, Ls.11-19.) in addition, the letter provided from 
Dr. Perrien addresses none of the factors required under I.C. § 19-2522(3), and 
therefore cannot provide an adequate basis in the record to excuse the court's failure to 
order a proper mental health evaluation. (Letter to the district court from Dr. Perrien, 
dated August 3,2007.) 
Likewise, the competency evaluations in this case cannot stand as a substitute 
for a mental health evaluation conducted for purposes of sentencing pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522. See State v. Banbury, 145 ldaho 265,270, 178 P.3d 630,635 (Ct. App. 
2007). First, as has been noted, such a use of the contents of a competency evaluation 
at sentencing violates Mr. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the 
expressed provisions of I.C. § 18-215. See Point I supra; Banbury, 145 ldaho at 270, 
178 P.3d at 635. Second, the district court apparently felt that the information contained 
within these reports was insufficient to address sentencing concerns, as the court 
requested an additional report from Dr. Perrien while Mr. Jockumsen was on his rider. 
See Banbury, 145 ldaho at 270, 178 P.3d at 635. (419107 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.) 
Finally, competency evaluations are conducted to determine fundamentally 
different questions, and thus will address fundamentally different concerns, than mental 
health evaluations conducted for sentencing purposes under I.C. 19-2522. 
Competency evaluations serve the purpose of determining whether the defendant may 
legally be subjected to any trial, conviction, sentencing, or punishment at all. See 
I.C. §§ 18-210-212. As such, the diagnostic thrust of competency evaluations looks to 
whether the defendant has the "capacity to understand the proceedings against him and 
to assist in his own defense." I . .  18-21 1 )  However, "psychological evaluations to 
determine a defendant's competence to stand trial or aid in his defense conducted 
pursuant to I.C. 18-21 1 often will be insufficient to inform the court's sentencing decision 
because they will not address the factors delineated in I.C. 19-2522(3)." Banbury, 145 
ldaho at 270, 178 P.3d at 635. The analysis of the defendant's diagnosed conditions 
under I.C. § 19-2522 focuses instead on factors relevant to appropriate punishment, 
such as the degree of the defendant's illness and level of impairment, which may impact 
upon the defendant's overall culpability for the offense; the available treatments for his 
condition, along with the risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment; and a 
consideration of the risk of danger that the defendant might pose if released back into 
the community. I.C. § 19-2522(3). As such, the inclusion of the competency 
evaluations within the PSI in this case cannot be said to constitute sufficient compliance 
with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). 
In addition to the improper inclusion of Mr. Jockumsen's competency evaluations, 
the presentence evaluator also appears to have misinformed the district court within the 
PSI regarding the actual indications of Mr. Jockumsen's medications for his psychosis. 
The investigator stated within this report that, "It should be note (sic), though Michael 
reports he is taking Seroquel for schizophrenia, Dr. Christianson's (sic) reported dated 
February 1, 2007, indicates 'Sleep is nonproblematic with prescription Seroquel."' (PSI, 
p.12.) Apparently interpreting this remark to mean that Seroquel's primary or sole 
indication was for insomnia, the evaluator then asserted, "He claimed he is taking the 
medication Seroquel for [schizophrenialpsychosis]; however, psychological records 
indicate this medication is for sleep." (PSI, p.15.) 
In actuality, Seroquel is prescribed for the treatment of psychosis, just as 
Mr. Jockumsen had indicated. See http://www.seroquel.comlbipolar-disorder/about- 
seroquel/what-is-seroquel.aspx. Mr. Jockumsen was also prescribed Zyprexa during 
his period of involuntary commitment, which is indicated for treatment of schizophrenia. 
See http://www.zyprexa.com/index.jsp. (PSI, p.28.) It is precisely this lack of informed 
analysis of Mr. Jockumsen's conditions and available treatments that demonstrates why 
a proper mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. 3 19-2522 was required in this case. 
In its absence, the district court was left to rely on incomplete data and incorrect 
assumptions of fact on perhaps the most central issue bearing on the court's sentencing 
decision in this case. 
It should also be noted that, while the APSI recommended that the district court 
relinquish jurisdiction, the ultimate recommendation of the evaluator was that, "Mr. 
Jockumsen would benefit from a long-term inpatient treatment program." (APSI, p.4.) A 
recommendation for treatment contained within a Presentence Investigation Report 
supports the determination that a mental health evaluation, which includes a discussion 
of available treatments and their efficacy, was needed in this case. Durham, 146 Idaho 
at 368, 195 P.3d at 727. 
The record also contains several references to Mr. Jockumsen's significant family 
history of mental illness, as well as past commitments to psychiatric institutions for 
treatment of his mental conditions. (413107 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-21; PSI, pp.4, 11-12.) This 
is further evidence that demonstrated the need for a mental health evaluation in this 
case, both to determine the degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness impacted 
upon his culpability for his offense and to determine the potential effectiveness of 
treatments to prevent similar criminal behaviors in the future. 
However, the evidence before the district court at sentencing failed to address 
nearly all of the critical factors that are required to be included within a mental health 
evaluation for sentencing purposes. Under I.C. § 19-2522(3), the psychological report 
ordered by the district court must include the following information: (I) a description of 
the nature of the examination; (2) a diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental 
condition of the defendant; (3) an analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or 
defect and level of functional impairment; (4) a consideration of whether treatment is 
available for the defendant's mental condition; (5) an analysis of the relative risks and 
benefits of treatment or non-treatment; and (6) a consideration of the risk of danger 
which the defendant may create for the public if at large. I.C. § 19-2522(3). The record 
relied on by the district court did not adequate meet these requirements, and failed to 
even address several of the key elements of the statutory requirements. 
Noticeably absent from the record was any substantive discussion of the degree 
to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental conditions may have altered or impaired his mental 
functioning. Given that Mr. Jockumsen had no record of violent criminal charges until 
approximately one month prior to the charge at issue in this appeal, an analysis of the 
degree to which Mr. Jockumsen's mental illness may have interfered with his self- 
control and contributed to his criminal behavior is an especially important consideration. 
As important, there was no evaluation of what treatments were potentially 
available to Mr. Jockumsen in order to address his mental conditions, or any evaluation 
of the potential risk to the public if Mr. Jockumsen were to receive mental health 
treatment in lieu of incarceration. The information provided to the district court prior to 
sentencing made it very clear that there was reason to believe that Mr. Jockumsen's 
mental conditions would be a significant factor at sentencing. However, this 
information, on its own, did not adequately meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). 
In light of this, the district court acted with manifest disregard for the provisions of I.C.R. 
32 when it failed to order a psychological report for sentencing purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jockumsen respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence, and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after a complete evaluation of 
Mr. Jockumsen's mental health conditions is made in accordance with I.C. § 19-2522 
and I.C.R. 32. Further, he requests that this Court remand his case to the district court 
with instructions to order a new presentence investigation report that omits the contents 
and conclusions of his competency evaluations, and further instruct the district court to 
forward the new presentence report to the Department of Correction. In the alternative, 
he asks that this Court reverse the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2009. 
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